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A Legal Theory of Finance1

Katharina Pistor

Abstract:
This paper develops the building blocks for a legal theory of finance. LTF holds that
financial markets are legally constructed and as such occupy an essentially hybrid place
between state and market, public and private. At the same time, financial markets exhibit
dynamics that frequently put them in direct tension with commitments enshrined in law
or contracts. This is the case especially in times of financial crises when the full
enforcement of legal commitments would result in the self-destruction of the financial
system. This law-finance paradox tends to be resolved by suspending the full force of law
where the survival of the system is at stake; that is, at its apex. It is here that power
becomes salient.
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1. Introduction

This paper develops the contours of a legal theory of finance (LTF) for contemporary
financial systems, i.e. systems that mobilize capital today for future returns. The history
of money and credit dates back millennia (Hodgson 2013), but the configuration of global
financial capitalism is of more recent vintage. It is this system that is the concern of this
paper and the theory it develops. LTF asserts that finance is legally constructed; it does
not stand outside the law. Financial assets are contracts the value of which depends in
large part on their legal vindication (Bradley 1902). Which financial assets will or will
not be vindicated and as such be enforceable is a function of legal rules and their
interpretation by courts and regulators. This may vary from legal system to legal system.
In a world of free capital flows, legally enforceable financial commitments that link
market participants from different countries and legal systems to one another determine
the scope of the financial system. The ability to design instruments that are not obviously
in conflict with existing rules in different jurisdictions even as they seek to mitigate their
costs on the issuers or holders of such instruments renders a comparative advantage. In
short, law and finance are locked into a dynamic process in which the rules that establish
the game are continuously challenged by new contractual devices, which in turn seek
legal vindication.
LTF is based on two premises outside of yet, as will become clear, re-enforced by
law: Fundamental uncertainty and liquidity volatility. The two go together: If the future
were known we could take precaution to deal with future liquidity scarcity; if liquidity
were always available on demand, i.e. a free good, we could refinance commitments
2

when the future arrives. Based on these premises LTF can illuminate core features of the
contemporary global financial system, including its inherent instability, its organization
into a apex and a periphery, the differential application of law in its different parts, and
last but not least the locus of discretionary power. As such LTF can serve as the
foundation for a political economy of finance.
Within this framework there is ample room for analyzing the behavior of actors using
rational choice models, but also a more socially embedded approach in socioeconomics
(see further infra under 5). LTF’s critical contribution is to emphasize that the legal
structure of finance is of first order importance for explaining and predicting the behavior
of market participants as well as market-wide outcomes.

2.

Uncertainty, Liquidity and the Instability of Finance

Before explaining the elements of LTF in greater detail I turn to the two premises on
which it rests -- uncertainty and liquidity volatility -- and their implications for the nature
of finance, namely its inherent instability. Frank Knight argued long ago that any attempt
to capture dynamic rather than static phenomena must grapple with the problem of
fundamental uncertainty; that is, with risk that cannot be quantitatively measured (Knight
1921). This is the case whenever circumstances are unique and deviate from “invariable
and universally known laws” (ibid at Iii.VII.3). They cannot be organized into variables
that lend themselves to probability calculations, and the distribution of possible outcomes
is unknown (ibid at III.VIII.2). What is called for in these cases is judgment, not calculus.
Keynes developed a similar concept in his Treaty on probability also published in 1921
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(Keynes 1921(2010)). Building on this insight he later emphasized that the process of
accumulating wealth is necessarily a long-term project that is beset by our inability to
know the future. Writing in 1937 he elaborated:
“The sense in which I am using the term [uncertainty] is that in which the prospect of
a European war is uncertain, or the price of copper and the rate of interest twenty
years hence, or the obsolescence of a new invention, or the position of private wealthowners in the social system in 1970. About these matters there is no scientific basis
on which to form any calculable probability whatever. We simply do not know.”
(Keynes 1937, 214)

A substantial body of evidence has been amassed suggesting that financial markets go
hand in hand with financial crises. Historians of finance have asserted that the history of
financial markets is a history of crises (Kindelberger 2005). Reinhart and Rogoff offer
eight hundred years of evidence that financial crises occur much more frequently than
people are willing to believe (Reinhart and Rogoff 2009). In fact, there is little
disagreement even among proponents of the efficient capital market hypothesis (ECMH)
that at least some aspects of finance are beset by inherent instability. Specifically, entities
that engage in maturity transformation, i.e. banks, are widely held to be vulnerable to
crises (Allen and Gale 2001; Levine 1998). They finance long-term commitments with
short-term funds that can be withdrawn on demand. Whenever too many depositors seek
to withdraw their money these entities face extinction with potential repercussions for
other entities and the system. The vulnerability of financial markets to such bank run has
found a regulatory response in the form of deposit insurance. Private intermediaries that
engage in similar maturity transformation, such as hedge funds, have instead unilaterally
redemption restrictions to ensure their survival in times of liquidity shortage.

4

Where there is disagreement is whether instability extends beyond intermediaries to
financial markets, or whether financial markets can instead solve the instability problem
by diversifying risk. Financial innovation has made possible the splitting of credit, default
and interest rate risk; prior to the global crisis it was widely believed that this kind of risk
diversification had ushered in a period of ‘great moderation’, where instability was
contained.2 There are, however, good reasons to believe that the root causes of instability
are the same for banks and markets. Both offer mechanisms for investing capital today in
the hope and expectation of positive future returns; and both have to confront the
conundrum that knowledge about the future is imperfect and liquidity not a free good.
Under these conditions, splitting risk cannot offer full protection against future events or
a reversal of liquidity abundance.
Frydman and Goldberg (2011) agree fundamental uncertainty affects markets and
renders them instable by invoking the notion of Imperfect Knowledge Economics (IKE).
They present empirical data showing how investors change the indicators (firm-specific
information, macroeconomic trends, psychology, political factors) they use for
determining their investment strategies at different times. Rather than following a predetermined strategy built on a fixed set of indicators, investors demonstrably engage in
non-routine change (ibid at pp. 199). They do so if and when there is compelling
evidence that current prices no longer reflect trends. This can be gauged not only from
data but also from behavior of other market participants. Re-interpreting Keynes’ famous
beauty contest, they argue that investing is not so much a guessing game about other

2

See Ben Bernanke, “The Great Moderation”, 20 February 2004 available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2004/20040220/default.htm for an argument that
macroeconomic policies account for the decreased volatility in the economy.
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people’s preferences, but results from a rational decision making process in which the
judgment of others factors into one’s own judgment (ibid at 120).
Still, it can be argued that the adjustment of investment strategies on its own need not
cause financial instability. Frydman and Goldberg suggest that it does so when
adjustment comes only after prices have entered extreme territory (ibid at 175). The
problem is that for assets without a long empirical track record, “extreme territory” can
be established only with hindsight by investors and regulators alike. There is, however,
another explanation for when fundamental uncertainty or imperfect knowledge can
trigger instability, namely when uncertainty meets the liquidity constraint (Minsky 1977
(1982)). The concept of liquidity as used in this paper is the ability to sell any asset for
other assets or for cash at will.3 Selling or buying assets is intertwined with balancing
one’s assets and liabilities and as such necessarily links funding liquidity and market
liquidity.
This definition differs from others used in the literature. Brunnermeir and Pedersen
(2009), for example, define market liquidity as the “difference between the transaction
price and the fundamental value” and funding liquidity as “speculators’ scarcity (or
shadow costs) of capital” (ibid at 2202). This assumes that it is possible to determine an
asset’s fundamental value as compared to their value or volatility relative to other assets
and to conceptually differentiate speculators from other investors. Yet, as the US
Supreme Court has put it, while “scholastics of medieval times professed a means to
make such a valuation of a commodity's ‘worth’”, this may not be a meaningful exercise

3

See also Keynes, who defines “liquidity preferences” as “a schedule of the amounts of his resources,
valued in terms of money or of wage-units, which he will wish to retain in the form of money in different
sets of circumstances”. See (Keynes 1937) Chapter 13 at II. See also Mehrling (2011, at 5/6) who
associates liquidity with shiftability (ibid at 38).
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for today’s courts nor arguably modern day academics in economics or law .4 In fact, as
the empirical evidence compiled by Goldberg and Frydman shows, it is not what market
actors do: they are more concerned with relative, not absolute value. Lastly, in a market
based credit system that is largely reliant on “Ponzi-finance”, as Minsky has defined
financing strategies that rely ex ante on refinancing in the future (Minsky 1986 at 226),
the distinction between speculators and other market participants becomes less tenable.
Adjusting existing investment strategies to new facts entails selling some assets and/or
buying new ones. Yet, not all assets may find takers, or only at a substantial loss, and not
all sellers will obtain refinancing, which they must when confronting shortfalls in assets
or cash needed to meet their own liabilities. In the worst case scenario a fire sale of assets
may occur which can trigger an economy-wide downward price readjustment and
potentially mass insolvencies. The likelihood of such an extreme scenario depends on
how many investors will have to seek refinancing at the same time; the number will be
higher the more investors have built their strategies on the ability to refinance on demand.
In short, for a crisis to occur imperfect knowledge must meet liquidity shortage.

3.

Generating Theory from Facts: LTF as an Inductive Theory

LTF is an inductive theory. It is derived from observable facts from across the whole
spectrum of finance, including stock markets, credit markets, sovereign debt markets,
foreign exchange markets and markets for derivatives. Markets rather than intermediaries
were chosen as the primary unit of analysis to highlight the fact that markets themselves,

4

BASIC INC. v. LEVINSON, 485 U.S. 224 (1988) at 255.
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just as financial intermediaries, are constructed in law and do not exist outside it and that
they too can experience runs, as the global financial crisis has vividly demonstrated.
The theory of science teaches us that one can hardly identify relevant empirical
observations without an underlying idea of an order in one’s mind, i.e. without a theory.
This does not mean, however, that one is limited to the mental maps that are currently in
use. It is possible, though difficult, to construct new theoretical maps, to compare them
with existing ones, and to ask whether they explain what is known about a specific field
of inquiry in a more consistent or unified fashion than its chief competitors (Viskovatoff
1999). The stylized facts further explained below should therefore be understood as the
construction site for a new theoretical map for the field of finance.
The most important stylized facts of contemporary finance, both national and global,
are first, that financial assets are legally constructed; second, that law contributes to
finance’s instability; third, that there is a pecking order of the means of pay, which
implies that finance is inherently hierarchical; and fourth, that the binding nature of legal
and contractual commitments tends to be inversely related to the hierarchy of finance:
Law tends to be binding on the periphery and relatively more elastic at the apex of the
financial system.

a. The Legal Construction of Finance
Financial systems comprise a complex interdependent web of contractual obligations,
or IOUs, that link market participants to one another. What one owes to another must be
funded by current assets or by claims owed by a third party. IOUs can be designed and
issued by private or public parties. Examples of publicly issued financial instruments are
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the officially designated state money, or legal tender, as well as sovereign debt contracts.
Money is not only a means of exchange or storage of value, it is the means by which
sovereign states collect their revenue and pay most of their debt and the default payment
within jurisdictions where it is legal tender. In the hands of investors on foreign exchange
markets money becomes another financial asset, and its value is determined in relation to
other currencies (Mehrling 2013). One critical determinant for that value is whether the
currency is backed by a sovereign willing and able to stand in for it (Kapadia 2013). The
Eurozone crisis illustrates the difficulty of maintaining a viable currency once that has
been called into question (ibid).
Sovereign debt may be issued under domestic or foreign law and may be
denominated in domestic or foreign currencies (Gelpern and Gulati 2013). It creates a
contractual obligation for a sovereign state. This renders the enforceability of debt
contracts at times doubtful. After all, entire states cannot be seized and liquidated
(Schwartz and Zurita 1992) only assets located overseas can be frozen. Moreover, when
debt is issued under their own laws, they can escape legal obligation by changing those
very laws.
Still, financiers have successfully sued even their own sovereigns for default as early
as the seventeenth century in England (Neal 1990). In fact, most states pay most of their
debt most of the tim, if not out of fear of being sued, in order to secure future access to
capital markets. The risk of litigation appears to be increasing in our own time especially
with respect to sovereign debt issued to foreign investors. Foreign investors in sovereign
bonds have brought arbitration proceedings against sovereigns that have defaulted on
their external debt (Halverson Cross 2011), and a recent court case raises the specter of
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enforceability of such claims in foreign courts, notwithstanding sovereign immunity. 5
This suggests that law matters even for contracts with a sovereign albeit in a more
circumspect or elastic fashion.6
As for financial instruments that are issued by private entities, they may be tailored to
specific clients or standardized with or without clauses that allow some adaptation.
Shares in a publicly traded company must, in principle, be transferable, and laws or stock
market rules impose govern voting arrangements, such as one-share-one-vote.
Irrespective of whether these legal design features are priced by the market, they do entail
different rights and obligations. Their relevance is revealed in critical life and death
situations – i.e. when a company faces a merger or takeover or seeks to reorganize.7
Further, the proliferation of preferred stock or convertible shares illustrates how legal
innovation can alter firms’ capital structure with important governance implications.
Complex capital structures devised by banks in response to regulation or to diffuse
takeover threats, for example, have undermined shareholder ‘voice’ in these entities
(Benston et al. 2000).
Credit contracts entail obligations to repay the principal plus interest at a future date,
but the form of pay and the structure of interest rate payments can vary considerably. In
addition to simple credits and bonds there is a wide range of tradable IOUs, from
commercial papers to asset-backed securities, from options to futures and swaps, from

5

See the recent decision of the Southern District of New York on the “pari passu” (meaning equal standing
of different creditors) clauses in Argentine sovereign debt contracts. NML Capital Ltd. Vs. Argentina, 26
October 2012, 12-105(L). Note, however, that the decision is currently under appeal.
6

One the elasticity of law at the apex of the system see infra under d.

7
Interestingly, charter provisions that might affect such scenarios are typically not priced at the IPO stage.
See (Klausner 2001).

10

simple derivatives to synthetic ones (Awrey 2013). Some are purely private constructs,
others, such as mortgage-backed securities, were first created by law but subsequently
mimicked and further developed by the private sector (Hyman 2011).
The critical role law plays in the construction of financial markets may be best
illustrated by the emergence of global derivatives markets (Awrey 2013)(Carruthers
2013). Derivatives had been known for quite a while before a global market in these
instruments arose. For this to occur contractual practices had to be standardized to ensure
scalability and reasonable assurance was needed that these instruments would withstand
legal scrutiny by regulators and courts in countries where they were issued, held, and
traded. The International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA), a private
organization that brought together the major issuers and brokers of these instruments as
well as their legal advisors (Morgan 2008), played a critical role in the rise of these
markets. It created standard contracts, adapted them to different legal systems around the
world, enlisted major law firms in these jurisdictions to opine on their enforceability, and
lobbied legislature to adapt their bankruptcy laws to the netting agreement contained
therein. Without extending the legal infrastructure to these new instruments it is hardly
conceivable that global derivatives markets would have grown into multi-trillion dollar
markets.
The web of legally permissible IOUs – credits, bonds, derivatives, but also common
stock, convertible shares etc. – that link parties to one another constitute financial
markets and determine their scope. An additional layer of interdependence is created by
the fact that many IOUs explicitly reference other assets or IOUs. Securitized mortgages
are tied to underlying mortgages and their interest schedule. Credit default swaps are
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insurance contracts designed to protect buyers of bonds and other instruments against
changes in the value of the underlying asset and require their issuers to put up additional
collateral should that price change. Other instruments are contractually linked to changes
in anchor interest rates, such as the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR, which is
constructed by the British Bankers’ Association with input from selected banks)8, or in
the price of assets that were deemed safe at the time of issuance, such as certain
sovereign debt. These contractual cross-references can trigger a pre-determined chain
reaction with potentially system-destabilizing effects as further discussed below.

b. Legal Sources of Finance’s Instability
Fundamental uncertainty paired with the liquidity constraint renders financial markets
instable. Given these conditions, pre-determined binding, non-negotiable legal
commitments can hasten a financial crisis and in the extreme case the financial system’s
demise.
Every depositor who places his money in a bank account has the right to withdraw
her funds on demand, so does every investor in an open-ended mutual or money-market
fund. Their rights are contractually created and protected by law. If all enforce their rights
at the same time, however, a system built around maturity mismatch must collapse.
Deposit insurance is one way to mitigate against this risk, but because of moral hazard
concerns is limited to regulated banks. Market based solutions tend to protect individual

8

The fact that LIBOR is not simply a market product but constructed by financial intermediaries at the
apex of the system has been revealed by the LIBOR scandal, which showed that banks that purportedly
reported actual borrowing costs (which would be used to construct LIBOR) often under-reported these
costs. See Brooks Masters, “Libor rates cull proposed for April”, The Financial Times, 9 November 2012
at 24.
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parties against future events through insurance devices; they tend to operate in a procyclical fashion and can therefore exacerbate rather than mitigate the system’s instability.
Take the example of AIG Financial Products (AIGFP), the London subsidiary of
AIG, which doled out US$31 bln in the first nine month of 2008 in response to
contractually agreed upon collateral calls when US housing prices decline (COP 2010).
AIGFP in turn had to balance its own assets and liabilities; it had taken precaution for its
exposure to potential collateral calls by opening a credit line with its parent company.
This arrangement brought AIG parent close to bankruptcy, from which it was saved only
by a government bailout. Notably, the US government takeover did not and could not
stop the bleeding, because it left existing contractual commitments intact. This prompted
the US government to acquire all outstanding CDSs at the nominal value of US$62 bln
(ibid at 39). Had they allowed AIG and its subsidiary to go bankrupt and be liquidated,
under existing bankruptcy laws creditors would have been left with empty hands and
their contractual claims would have been extinguished. Because of the contractual
interdependencies built into the system, such an event would have had serious
repercussions for global financial markets. Specifically, AIGFP had issued huge volumes
of CDS in the years leading up to the crisis to major financial intermediaries around the
world. Had the CDS been cancelled, the French bank Société General would have had to
make up for a shortfall of insurance in the amount of US$16.5 bln, Goldman Sachs in the
amount of US$14.5bln and Deutsche Bank in the amount of US$8.5 bln (ibid at 94). That
in turn would have required them to make up for these losses, a difficult if not impossible
proposition in the immediate aftermath of the collapse of Lehman Brothers when global
financial markets had come to a virtual standstill (NCCFEC US 2011). Even entities
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without direct exposure to AIG issued CDSs might have implicated, because they were
trading bonds insured by CDS AIG had issued or were transacting with major banks
directly exposed to them. In short, while perfectly rational from the perspective of
individual contractors, pre-determined, non-negotiable obligations designed to mitigate
the effect of future contingencies on individual parties, such as collateral calls, margin
calls, etc., can increase the financial system’s vulnerability to crisis. They are necessarily
based on assumptions about future events (i.e. a low probability that they would occur)
that might turn out to be false.

c. Finance as a Hierarchical System
As stated above, public and private entities make, issue and trade financial
instruments, i.e. contractual commitments that are enforceable in a court of law. In
normal times most financial instruments appear as close substitutes to official or state
money in the sense that they can easily be bought and sold for one another or for cash.
However, when too many investors seek to change their portfolio of assets at the same
time, some assets will no longer find takers as investors flee to safety: They buy cash or
close cash substitutes, such as reputable corporate or government bonds. This implies that
finance is not flat, but hierarchical (Mehrling 2012).
A complex system of interdependent contractual commitments can be maintained and
might even appear to be flat as long as there are enough intermediaries willing and able to
acquire all kinds of financial instruments, if only for a premium. Many financial
intermediaries make money in good times by offering two-way dealer services to other
market participants against a premium to cover the liquidity risk they take on. Without
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these two-way dealer services many markets for assets would simply not exist (Mehrling
2012), and when dealers no longer offer liquidity these markets crash (Brunnermeier and
Pedersen 2009).
Private lenders and dealers at times step in to dampen a liquidity crisis and buy assets
for which there are only few buyers left – usually in the hope of making a profit by
selling them once markets have recovered or to a lender or dealer or last resort. Consider,
for example, MF Global’s investment in distressed European sovereign debt in late 2011
in the expectation that interventions by the European Central Bank (ECB) would drive up
prices before its funding dried up. In the end, ECB intervention came too late for MF
Global, which had used short-term hedges that matured before the bonds thus upping the
ante.

9

Ultimately the brokerage was forced into bankruptcy. This example holds

important lessons for private parties as emergency lenders or dealers in times of crisis.
They can assume this role only up to the point where their own survival is at stake. This
implies that in the last instance the only true lender or dealer of last resort is an agent with
unlimited supplies of high-powered money (Mehrling 2011).

Only few actors can

assume this role: Sovereigns (or their central banks) that control their own currency and
who issue most of their debt in that currency.
The global crisis demonstrated that Ireland, for example, lacked these attributes. The
lack of its own currency undermined its ability to stabilize finance by socializing private
debt. The ensuing sovereign debt crisis raised questions about Ireland’s ability to ever
grow out of this debt burden, thereby undermining its ability to refinance itself on

9
See Miles Weiss, Cristina Alesci & Matt Leising, “Corzine Pushed Europe Bet to $11.5 Billion”,
Bloomberg 29 November 2011, available at www.bloomberg.com/news (last visited 2 February 2013).
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international debt markets – forcing it ultimately to accept a European bailout. Most
emerging markets that have their own currency but are forced to borrow in foreign
currency find themselves in a similar predicament (Kinsella and Leddin 2010). There is
thus a clear hierarchy in global finance, which is mirrored in the organization of foreign
exchange markets. The dollar occupies the apex of the system. It is the currency against
which other ‘major’ currencies are compared before they are compared to one another
(Mehrling 2013) and it is the currency for which there is the highest demand in times of
crisis irrespective of weaknesses in the performance of the US economy. Many other
currencies never make it into the pages of the financial press, because they are rarely
traded indicating that they are not deemed important assets in global foreign exchange
markets.
Domestic financial markets are also hierarchical. This can be illustrated by examining
the measures the US Federal Reserve took in response to the global crisis. It created six
major liquidity facilities between March and November of 2008 (OIG 2010) known by
their acronyms: TSLF, PDCF, AMLF, CPFF, MMIFF and TALF. 10 They were
established to provide liquidity to different intermediaries in the following order: first to
primary dealers authorized to acquire US treasuries at the New York Fed’s open market
desk;11 second to special purpose vehicles of major banks (many of which also operate
primary dealer desks) that invested heavily in sovereign and corporate bonds; third to
intermediaries with exposure to asset backed commercial papers of non-financials

10

These acronyms stand for: Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF), Primary Dealer Credit Facility
(PDCF), Asset Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility (AMLF),
Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF), Money Market Investor Funding Facility (MMIFF) and Term
Asset Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF). For details see (OIG 2010, 3).
11

Appendix IV of the document lists the primary dealers as of June 2010.
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(among them again money market funds); and last to intermediaries investing in asset
backed consumer loans. The sequence of Fed actions reflects its primary concern with
ensuring the proper functioning of the apex of the system, namely the funding of the
sovereign, followed by the funding of intermediaries that fund the sovereign, followed by
the funding of their counterparties. This implies that the first order funders and their
immediate counterparties find themselves in closest proximity to the apex of the system.
In contrast, intermediaries lending to firms or consumers were last in order, signifying
their peripheral status. They were thrown a lifeline at long last, but primarily for political
reasons (the fear that austerity might create structural unemployment or a political
backlash), not because they posed an immediate threat to the system. As will become
clear in the subsequent section one’s location in the hierarchical system has important
implications for one’s legal treatment in times of crisis and beyond.

d. Law’s Elasticity
A legal system committed to the rule of law is meant to apply law irrespective of
status or identity. Contracts are designed to create credible commitments that are
enforceable as written. Yet, closer inspection of contractual relations, laws and
regulations in finance suggests that law is not quite as evenly designed or applied
throughout the system. Instead, it is elastic. The elasticity of law can be defined as the
probability that legal commitments will be upheld in the future irrespective of changes in
circumstances;12 the lower that probability the more elastic the law. In general, law tends
to be relatively elastic at the system’s apex, but inelastic on its periphery. It is thus at the

12

Suggested by Sarah Quinn at the final workshop of this research project.
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periphery where default is most likely to result in involuntary exit. In contrast, at the apex
where the very survival of the system is at stake, law tends to be more elastic by design
and/or because the system’s ultimate backstops abrogates the discretionary power to do
what it takes to rescue the system.13
Contractual arrangements are often hardwired, but not all are equally so. Private
swaps and derivatives contracts consist of hundred of pages that stipulate the conditions
that trigger collateral calls and specify their amounts. In contrast, the Federal Reserve Act
empowered the Fed in emergency situations to lend against “adequate collateral”.14 The
swap agreements between major central banks meant to secure the global payment
system occupy only seven pages of text even as they deal with billions of dollars, euros,
francs, pounds or yens.15 What are in substance similar transactions (i.e. swaps) can take
different forms depending on who the parties are and where they are located in the
hierarchical financial system.16
Similar patterns can be found elsewhere in the global hierarchy of finance. Consider
the different fates of homeowners in the context of plummeting real estate markets in
countries around the world. Homeowners in the US may on the periphery of the US
financial system (see supra). While major financial intermediaries received emergency
liquidity support from the Fed or government bailouts, homeowners faced personal
bankruptcy and foreclosure in accordance with the law. However, they are still better off
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The chairman of the Fed, Ben Bernanke, famously defined this role as “we do everything it takes” to
save the financial system.
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See Sec. 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act prior to changes introduced by the Dodd-Frank Act, which still
grant substantial discretion to the Fed in determining the conditions under which it will extend liquidity.
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Note that frequently private contracts make broad reference to standard swaps, which makes them appear
shorter than they are. That is still consistent with the argument.
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as compared to their counterparts in Hungary or Spain. The debt of Hungarian
homeowners, for example, was compounded by the fact that two thirds of mortgages
were made in foreign currency – the euro or Swiss franc – and these currencies
appreciated in the midst of the crisis (by 40 percent) relative to the domestic currency
(Rona-Tas and Guseva 2013).17 Moreover, in Spain (and most other countries) mortgage
backed loans are full recourse loans (whereas in many states in the US they are not
(Ghent and Kudlyak 2011)): If property value is under water, homeowners still carry the
burden of the entire amount they had contracted for. The global market for real estate
finance thus also exhibits an apex and a periphery, where homeowners at the periphery
carry not only the full credit risk, but frequently also the currency risk. If anything, the
difference between apex and periphery is more pronounced, because in the transnational
realm there are fewer mechanisms to distribute loss.
Financial innovation plays an important role in managing the elasticity of contractual
commitments as well as legal constraints. An important purpose of financial innovation is
to alleviate the costs of regulation by, for example, freeing capital from reserve
requirements and making them available for lending purposes. Some authors have
attributed the rise of sometimes destabilizing financial innovation with the constraints
imposed by the Basel Accord. It is said to have created incentives for the extensive use of
off-balance sheet accounting and structured finance to free up regulatory capital (Acharya
and Richardson 2009). Regulatory reforms in the aftermath of the financial crisis have
triggered another round of financial innovation to mitigate the costs of these regulations
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for individual firms. Examples include synthetic exchange traded funds (ETFs) and
collateral swaps, further discussed by Awrey in this issue. Or take the case of central
bank swap lines. When financial markets froze trade suffered because parties no longer
had access to liquid foreign exchange (FX) markets. The solution was for Central Banks
to act as each other’s go between in supplying the relevant FX to domestic parties
(Obstfeld, Shambaugh, and Taylor 2009). However, not every central bank received a
swap line from the Fed or the guardians of the other major currencies; only those deemed
critical for stability did.18
These examples suggest that while hierarchy may be “inherent” to modern finance
(Mehrling 2013), its specific manifestation is anything but natural. The countries at the
top of the global hierarchy owe their position to historical contingencies, for example as
winners of world wars (the US) or beneficiaries of cold wars (Germany). Their position
has been enhanced by the fact that they (the G7) also controlled the rules of the game for
global finance set forth in the Basel Concordat and the Basel Accords, and not
coincidentally, by the prowess of the financial intermediaries they house.
Where one is located in the hierarchy matters for one’s survival constraint. Those at
the very apex of the system exercise discretionary powers in times of crisis over whether
to intervene and whom to rescue; and those sufficiently close to the apex are more likely
to benefit from the relaxation or suspension of ex-ante legal commitments than those on
the periphery. Law matters for the position of different actors within the hierarchy.
Whether housing loans are structured as recourse or non-recourse loans determines the
distribution of losses between borrowers and lenders from a steep decline in real estate
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value. It also matters whether the parties to a derivatives contract can net out their claims
outside the pool of assets available for distribution to all other creditors. This effectively
prioritizes them over other creditors and has contributed to the growth of derivatives
markets (Morgan 2008; Carruthers 2013). Similarly, whether sovereigns can issue debt
under their own law or that of a foreign jurisdiction affects the borrower’s room to
maneuver ex post.
On rule of law grounds such differential application of the law is objectionable. Yet,
in the context of a highly instable financial system the elasticity of law has proved time
and again critical for avoiding a complete financial meltdown. This was the most
important lesson drawn from the Great Depression, when the Fed’s refusal to buy but
those assets that had been enumerated in law contributed to collapse (Mehrling 2011, 35).
The degree of elasticity and discretion that is required to stabilize a financial system
depends, of course, in large measure on how much instability it tolerates in the first place,
i.e. on its legal construction. The greater the tolerance for financial instability ex ante, the
more likely that law and contracts will have to be suspended ex post – even though this
undermines the credibility of financial contracting on which the system rests.

4.

The Legal Theory of Finance

These stylized facts can be woven into a legal theory of finance. The goal is to
develop a theoretical map that is internally consistent and offers explanations for how
contemporary finance operates in good as well as in bad times. No attempt will be made
to systematically test this theory at this point. That is left to future research. Instead,
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evidence taken from case studies published in this issue and other sources will be used to
explain the theory’s main building blocks, which explain finance as (a) rule-bound
systems that are (b) essentially hybrid and (c) beset by the law-finance paradox, which
reveals the location of (d) power, defined as the differential relation to law.

a. Financial Markets as Rule-bound Systems
Financial markets do not exist outside rules but are constituted by them. It is possible
to distinguish different rules and rule makers, such as private and public ones. This has
led some to argue that actors can opt out of the legal system and constitute their own
system (Bernstein 1992). This system, however, is also rule-bound. The more a financial
system moves from relational finance to entity and ultimately markets, the more it
depends on a formal legal system with the capacity to authoritatively vindicate the rights
and obligations of contractual parties or to lend its coercive powers to the enforcement of
such claims.19 The credibility and value of fungible financial contracts depends on such
backing. This is why an organization such as the ISDA was formed to develop templates
for financial instruments that would be enforceable in multiple jurisdictions and lobbied
states to ensure that critical pieces of legislation validated the contracts it sponsors.
The central role of law in financial contracting is reflected in the fact that every
financial intermediary wanting to issue a new financial instrument employs lawyers to
ensure that it is compliant with relevant laws and regulations. This is done even, or
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precisely, when their very purpose is to mitigate regulatory costs for the issuer. 20
Regulatory arbitrage is a sophisticated process by which financial innovation is made
rule-compliant at least on its face (Awrey 2013). This is costly and often requires
extensive negotiations with regulators or redrafting in the wake of court challenges. Yet,
without this these instruments would have little value.
There is therefore no such thing as ‘unregulated’ financial markets, and de-regulation
is a misnomer (Hodgson 2013). It signifies not the absence of regulation, but the
delegation of rule making to different, typically non-state actors, with the understanding
that in all other respects they enjoy the full protection of the law. The delegation of such
rule-making powers is not limited to small-scale markets. Indeed, the governance of the
largest of all financial markets, the global foreign exchange market, has been delegated to
a club-like informal coalition of market participants and public regulators (Harvey 2013).
That, however, does not make these markets rule-less or external to the law. There is
hardly a market where the presence of sovereigns is stronger than in FX markets. After
all, what are traded in these markets are currencies issued by sovereign states. They are
the principals in these transactions, with private intermediaries effectively posing as their
agents (Mehrling 2013).
The peculiar structure of global FX markets as we know them today emerged after the
demise of the Bretton Woods system. It resulted as much from turf fighting among
different US regulators as from a sustained attempt to design a useful governance
structure for these markets. Incidentally, it framed domestic and global derivatives
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markets for the decades that followed. It all started with an amendment to the 1974
Commodities Future and Trading Act introduced by the US Treasury, the so-called
Treasury Amendment (TA) discussed by Harvey and Awrey in this issue. The TA
deliberately cordoned off futures and swaps, and because of its broad phrasing effectively
all derivatives, from the oversight of the Commodities Future and Trading Commission
(CFTC).21 The major justification was that the primary dealers in these markets were best
equipped to govern them. Moreover, the Treasury assured Congress that it, through the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, together with the Fed would operate as foreign
exchange markets’ shadow regulator. The Fed, of course, is not only a shadow regulator,
but also a market participant. It forged an alliance with key market participants by
establishing the Foreign Exchange Committee housed at the New York Fed (itself owned
by major banks), which facilitates the coordination of market governance. Private
membership in this organization is determined by market share (Harvey 2013).
Sovereign debt markets pose the greatest challenge for the assertion that all financial
markets are rule-bound, because sovereigns can manipulate the legal basis on which they
issue debt and enjoy far-reaching immunity from litigation and prosecution. They can
decree the riskiness of sovereign debt in national law (thereby inducing financial
intermediaries to hold lots of it) and so far have been able to maintain that stance for
global prudential regulation as well (see Gelpern and Gulati in this issue).22 This reflects
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the fact that they occupy by definition the apex of their domestic financial system. Still,
sovereign debt markets are also rule-bound. Sovereigns are reluctant to default on their
debt and when they do seek to give it the appearance of rule abidance. As Gelpern and
Gulati point out, when Greek restructured its debt it sought to legitimize this action by
pointing to negotiations with ‘major creditors’. It also subjected new bonds to the law of
England, thus relinquishing its power to unilaterally enforce another restructuring in the
future. In short, sovereign debt markets occupy an interesting place in the legal
construction of global markets. The central role of sovereigns in these markets imposes
limits on the legal enforceability of contractual commitments. That, however, does not
place sovereign debt outside the law or commonly accepted rules of conduct in global
financial markets as those countries that have repeatedly thwarted these rules have found
out when trying to re-access the market after a default.

b. Financial Markets’ Essential Hybridity
The discussion of FX and sovereign debt markets highlights another features of
finance that permeates it from top to bottom: its essential hybridity. Financial systems are
not state or market, private or public, but always and necessarily both (Mehrling, this
issue). This follows from the fact that financial instruments must be enforceable, that
finance is hierarchical and that in the last instance a sovereign has to stand in to protect
the financial system from self-destruction.
Anyone can issue IOUs, whether public or private. But not all IOUs find takers at all
times; even those that do initially may not be sellable at a future date when liquidity
shortages privilege cash or cash substitutes. Cash, of course, is the legal tender that states,
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not private parties, alone can issue. This official money is the default currency and the
benchmark for valuing other assets traded in the economy. Moreover, all final settlement
between financial institutions and between them and the central bank is done in the
official legal tender. Money is also the currency used by the government to make its
(domestic) payments and collect on its claims, including its tax claims.
This is not to say that currencies not backed by state money cannot exist. However,
they tend to be instable and prone to collapse whenever commitments made in the past
require substantial readjustment in light of new events. Consider the fate of bank-issued
money in the US prior to the establishment of the US dollar as the common currency.
Many state banks issued their own IOUs with nothing but their own assets to back them.
Predictably, they failed whenever too many claimants sought to make good on their
claims at the same time (Dwyer 1996). This follows from the hierarchy of finance and
the fact that non-state entities by definition have limited resources. Critically, their ability
to mobilize fresh resources may falter precisely when it is most needed, namely in times
of crisis.
Even with a common currency but without a public backstop a financial system is on
instable footing. Mr. JP Morgan was able to coordinate a private sector rescue of the US
financial system in 1907, but only because relative to the capacity of the private entities
involved in the rescue its size was still manageable. The crisis raised sufficient concerns
about the reliability of private sector bailouts to provide the political impetus for a new
central bank, the Federal Reserve, established in 1913 (Carlson and Wheelock 2012).
That even such a system is not immune to crisis was revealed in the Great Depression
when thousands of banks failed as the Federal Reserve stood by, hamstrung by legal
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rules23 on what assets it could possibly accept against cash, the only means of pay that
would find takers in the midst of the crisis.
Even absent such restrictions not all central banks or all sovereigns have access to
unlimited supplies of high-powered money. Those without their own currency or with
debt denominated in foreign currencies do not. Without such resources, a country that
faces a banking crisis typically finds itself in a currency and sovereign debt crisis as well.
To be effective any outside help must come from more credible backstops, i.e. other
sovereigns or their agents, such as the International Monetary Fund, which itself is
funded by sovereign states (Woods 2006). The US government helped Mexico in 1994 in
the midst of the Tequila crisis to the tune of US$50 bln;24 the IMF played a critical role in
the East Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s (Feldstein 2002); and a consortium of the
IMF, the ECB and the European Commission (the Troika) is now at work in the
European sovereign debt crises.
In sum, describing finance as a system of private/private commitments subject to
some (external) constraints that may enhance market efficiency or distort it as the case
might be (Gilson and Kraakman 1984) misses much of what is unique to contemporary
finance: It is based on money as the legal tender, relies on the legal enforceability of
private/private commitments and in the last instance depends on backstopping by a
sovereign. Indeed, the scale of today’s transnational financial markets would not be
feasible without their legal backing, even as the very size of financial markets thus
created pushes the limits of what sovereigns are willing or able to provide, individually or
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collectively. The essential hybridity of finance thus also points to where ultimate power
over finance rests: with the polities that are backstopping the system. Central bankers
may have replaced their voice by speedy action for now: “Forget the G7 – Watch the C5”
as Mehrling put it in a blog. 25 And yet, their effectiveness ultimately hinges on the
legitimacy of their actions in the eyes of the public that entrusts them with their
discretionary powers.

c. The Law-Finance Paradox
It follows that law and finance stand in an uneasy, paradoxical relation to one another.
Law lends credibility to financial instruments by casting the benevolent glow of coercive
enforceability over them. But the actual enforcement of all legal commitments made in
the past irrespective of changes in circumstances would inevitably bring down the
financial system. If, however, the full force of law is relaxed or suspended to take account
of such change, the credibility law lends to finance in the first place is undermined.
The propensity of a financial system to reach the point of crisis or self-destruction at
which only the suspension of ex-ante commitments can save it is determined by how it is
constructed in the first place. Different financial instruments are associated with different
risks for investors and the overall system. Every IOU entails some future commitment to
pay, but not all require payment of a fixed amount at a future date irrespective of actual
earnings. Credit instruments do, but common stock does not: Paying dividends is tied to
profits actually generated,26 and in the event of bankruptcy common stockholders are last
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Different corporate laws contain different rules for this. Some require profits made for the year prior to
pay out; others, including Delaware, allow for surplus generated for the past 2 years and allow directors to
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in line to recover. In its unadulterated form equity finance ensures that the fortunes of
stockholders and firms are tied to one another, which is why greater reliance on equity
finance especially by financial intermediaries has been called for {Admati, 2013 #3671}.
In contrast, creditors can extract repayment irrespective of the firm’s actual earnings to
the point of insolvency. The power to “toll the bells to firms” (Pistor 2008) is what gives
creditors so much leverage. In practice, the distinction between equity and debt finance
has become increasingly blurred, not the least because of regulatory leniency. Equity is
often credit-financed and debtors seek refinancing if they cannot make due on their
obligations to creditors. Actual earnings thus become a second order concern to access to
liquidity. Yet, the more a system relies on refinancing, the more fragile it is (Minsky,
1986).
Individual market participants will seek to protect themselves against the vagaries of
fragile finance. They will seek to shift the burden of uncertainty to their counter parties.
A good example is the bargaining power banks use to shift the burden of dealing with
future uncertainties to their customers (Rona-Tas and Guseva in this issue). Alternatively,
market participants they will enter into hedging transactions or buy insurance. That,
however, does not purge uncertainty or liquidity scarcity from the system. Indeed, those
least capable of dealing with the burden of uncertainty are unlikely to offer much
protection against a crisis building up from the periphery towards the center. Similarly,
when too many rely on insurance and the event that triggers payout actually materializes
(irrespective of the low probability assigned to it), these legal mechanisms can further

tap into corporate capital (so called “nimble” capital rule). These legal choices affect the vulnerability of
corporations to future change.
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destabilize the system by causing a run on viable assets or intermediaries. At this point
the system can be saved only by relaxing or suspending the full force of law: By making
funding available where no funding is owed and by bailing out intermediaries that should
be liquidated in accordance with the law.

d. Power as the Differential Relation to Law
Unpacking the legal construction of finance thus leads us to the elasticity of law and
from there to the political economy of finance. Where law is elastic decisions are not
predetermined by legal rules but left to the discretion of “power wielders” (Grant and
Keohane 2005). Power can thus be defined as the differential relation to law. Where law
is elastic power becomes salient. The critical questions are who exercises it, to whose
benefit, how its exercise is legitimated and to whom the power wielders are held
accountable.
Power is exercised throughout the financial system. It is exercised by those who have
the resources to extend support to others without being legally obliged to do so. Those
who have access to unlimited resources have the most power: Sovereigns with control
over their own currency and debt. Their access to unlimited resources derives from their
power to issue the legal tender, to use their means of coercion to levy taxes on their
subjects and to coordinate political and economic resources to make credible its
commitments (Kapadia 2013). The absence of any of these three conditions can
undermine the credibility of a sovereign as effective lender of last resort. By the same
token it positions the sovereign towards the periphery of the global hierarchy of finance.
The Eurozone crisis vividly demonstrates that the absence of either taxing power or
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political unity undermines the viability of the common currency (ibid). This in turn has
undermined the euro’s quest to compete with the US dollar for global reserve status.
Similarly, investors’ fears about the US ‘fiscal cliff’ – the automatic budget reductions
that was feared to push the US economy into a recession27 – suggests that the mere power
of the sovereign to tax is not sufficient. The ability to mobilize the political will to use
this power and coordinate other policies that are conducive to effective economic
management are equally important.
Emerging markets are more likely to issue their debt for the most part under foreign
law, and detailed debt covenants specify their obligations in contracts designed by law
firms in London or New York and issued for the most part under the laws of these
jurisdictions with underwriter involvement. In contrast, most developed economies issue
debt without such formalities, (Gelpern and Gulati 2013). If debt is issued under domestic
law it is, in principle, always renegotiable, as the sovereign can change the terms of the
underlying legislation (see supra). Debt issued under foreign law requires contractual
provisions, such as collective action clauses (CACs), lest every single creditor can veto
its renegotiation. CACs have been common in sovereign debt covenants issued under
English law, but not those issued under New York law. Indeed, there was widespread fear
that the introduction of such clauses might increase the costs of borrowing for emerging
markets (ibid). This signifies that for countries on the periphery an unrelenting adherence
to contractual commitments was deemed critical for their access to global capital
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markets. 28 Similarly, when countries in the Eurozone agreed to introduce CACs into
sovereign debt contracts for their domestic debt, concerns were raised that these countries
were thereby putting themselves on equal footing with the likes of Zimbabwe (ibid).
Market participants thus distinguish between formalizing the elasticity of contractual
commitments and retaining an informal option to change the conditions of debt contracts.
The latter is reserved for those who are or would like to be at the system’s apex.
One’s location in the hierarchical financial system is not determined by one’s own
actions alone or the raw size of their economy. When events necessitate the readjustment
of investment strategies, investors flee to assets they regard as relatively more safe. These
actions render the ones left holding assets others have dumped on the periphery of the
system where their fate will be decided by the full force of the law – unless they find a
backstop willing and able to step in and accept these assets against more credible ones or
cash. The availability of a viable backstop determines the credibility of different assets in
times of crisis and in doing so the survival chances of those who hold them.
In principle, private and public dealers can perform such backstopping functions. Yet,
private dealers face a hard budget constraint. 29 They therefore tend to cease recue
operations when these activities might undermine their own survival. Thus, Goldman
Sachs provided a lifeline to Bear Stearns by effectively guaranteeing (for a fee) its
derivatives obligations until days before it collapsed.30 It withdrew support when it feared
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that its own viability was put at risk. At that point there was only one place left to go: The
US Fed, with its unlimited access to high-powered money.
Neither private nor public dealers are legally obliged to provide liquidity to entities in
distress, and no one has a legal claim to be rescued. Goldman Sachs was not obliged to
offer a lifeline to Bear Stearns and faced no liability when it withdrew it. Similarly,
central banks are not legally obliged to offer convertibility to most or all assets into legal
tender and are sometimes explicitly barred from doing so – as is the ECB with regards to
lending directly to sovereign members or was the Fed in the Great Depression. They (or
other regulators) may be legally required to make good on deposit insurance or honor
requests for cash at their discount window to eligible entities, but these obligations are
limited in scope – and purposefully so. In the event of a crisis, however, legal constraints
are more often honored in their breach than in their enforcement.

e. LTF in a Nutshell
Taken together, the elements of LTF suggest that law is central to finance in at least
three respects: Law lends authority to the means of payment; it spurs regulatory pluralism
by delegating rulemaking to different stakeholders; it vindicates financial instruments and
other financial contracts. State authorized and backed money serves as the backbone of
modern financial systems. It is the common reference price for all other assets; it is also
the asset of last resort when others no longer find takers. Further, law sets the stage for
legal pluralism by determining which actors, activities, and instruments to regulate and
which to leave to private regulation. The greater the tolerance for competing regulatory
regimes, the greater the probability that competition will increasingly take the form of
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regulatory arbitrage, i.e. the gaming of the very system that makes and shapes finance.
Last but not least, law recognizes contracts and defines the contours of their
enforceability. This enhances their credibility, but to the extent that financial instruments
are designed to weaken regulatory costs it effectively sanctions regulatory arbitrage and
the erosion of formal law.
Several predictions about the development of finance can be derived from this
analysis. First, legal reforms and contractual devices that create credible commitments
support the expansion of finance into the periphery both domestically and globally. This
implies that in times of crisis they will face the full force of the law. Contraction is
therefore more likely there than at the system’s apex at least in the initial stages of the
crisis, but can build from there towards the apex. Second, actors will seek to position
themselves strategically towards the apex of the domestic or global system where they
are most likely to benefit from another lifeline. Individual actors may not have full
control over their location in the system, but they can influence it by various means
ranging from social or political ties to influencing the rulemaking process, to making
themselves systemically important. Third, jointly these forces are likely to lead over time
to a greater concentration of finance at the apex where the ultimate backstop resides.
Fourth, the greater concentration of finance at the apex will require the mobilization of
ever-larger resources to stabilize it. Fifth, because these resources are tied to sovereigns
they require political backing of the ultimate backstop’s polity. In the last instance it is
the polity of whoever happens to be the global backstop that will determine the fate of
our global financial system.
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5.

LTF through the Lens of Competing Theories

LTF differs from other theories on finance in that it calls attention to finance’s legal
construction. Recognizing the importance of law to finance is not new, but asserting that
law is essential to the very existence of contemporary finance is. This also puts LTF apart
from theories in socioeconomics that have long asserted the relevance of social structures
to finance, but have been less explicit about the specific role attributed to law or the state
as compared to other structures (Hodgson 2009). Finally, while various economic
theories have recognized the inherent instability of finance, they tend to abstract from the
legal and institutional structures. LTF complements these theories by illuminating the
legal and institutional transmission mechanisms of instability.

a. Law & Finance
The literature on law and finance is of relatively recent vintage. It emerged in
recognition of the difficulties of developing financial markets in the former socialist
world and emerging markets (Shleifer and Vishny 1997; La Porta et al. 1998). The major
insight of this literature is that law matters to finance mostly by vindicating investor
rights: Legal systems that better protect these rights tend to have more developed
financial systems. The choice of legal system in turn has been linked to politics in the
early development of the new nation states (Glaeser and Shleifer 2002). Those with
greater political stability could afford decentralized systems of legal ordering whereas
those that faced chaos were beholden to centralized control with weaker property rights

35

afforded to individuals (Djankov et al. 2003). This was the birth of the “New
Comparative Economics”, published in this journal ten years ago.
Thus, Law & Finance offers both a theory of how law relates to finance and an
account of the political economy of legal systems. However, unlike LTF it treats law and
finance as separate spheres that are related in a causal, unidirectional fashion, not as
structurally intertwined. Law determines the degree of investor protection and thereby
establishes the rules of the game for a financial market place in which actors respond to
the incentives law creates. Absent legal protection investors would have to rely more on
tangible assets, such as large stakes in firms, to exercise control. It follows that within
this theoretical framework law plays a critical role in the making of liquid markets in that
the protection afforded by law replaces more primitive forms of control. But this is where
the story ends. Better protection of individual rights is always associated with better
finance and negative feedback loops are ruled out. Any deviation is attributed to
exogenous factors, such as wars, natural catastrophes or financial crises (La Porta, Lopezde-Silanes, and Andrei 2008). Law & Finance is thus a theory for good times in finance,
not one for bad times.
Further, Law & Finance assumes that knowledge is perfect and liquidity is a free
good. Only then does the equation of better protection equals better financial systems
hold. If instead knowledge is imperfect and market participants cannot fully predict the
future, they will need to readjust past investment strategies. Under these conditions strong
legal protection may prevent the adjustment of commitments made in the past to account
for change. Moreover, while Law & Finance asserts that good law creates the right
incentives for good behavior, and bad law for bad behavior. Yet, what is good or bad law,
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good or bad behavior may well differ when viewed from the perspective of individual
actors or the system. Financial innovation that gives an entity a competitive edge over
others by mitigating the effects of regulation may enhance its profitability. The same
actions may destabilize the system, especially when widely mimicked by others, as they
will be in a competitive system. In theory, actors should anticipate the potential harmful
effects of their action. However, they can do this only if they have unlimited foresight as
to what effects their individual actions may have on the system as a whole. Even then,
they may bet on a rescue by a lender of last resort. Moral hazard is, of course, a staple in
standard economics. What is less appreciated is that the need for bail out may be caused
by the very legal protections that are meant to further financial development. That would
require a shift from the belief in the equilibrating forces of markets to recognizing their
inherent instability.
Reaching the conclusion that finance is instable does not necessarily require
conversion to Keynesianism. Mainstream economists have arrived at similar results only
by different routes. Allen and Gale have shown that ‘incomplete’ financial markets tend
to spread contagion, a key source of market instability (Allen and Gale 2000). Moreover,
incomplete contract theory (Hart and Moore 1999) has established that no matter how
hard parties try, they cannot write complete contracts. Incomplete contract theory
recognizes not only transaction costs but also uncertainty as the root causes for this
imperfect state of the world: Parties are fundamentally unable to foresee future
contingencies. Indeed, Bolton and Rosenthal have shown that under conditions of
extreme uncertainty (they use the case of agriculture in 19th century US) ex post
intervention by the state in private contracting can be socially optimal (Bolton and
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Rosenthal 2002). They suggest that debt contracts that are not state-contingent in their
payment obligations are incomplete. Viewed in this light, a debt moratorium is means for
completing contracts when unforeseen contingencies actually materialize. The LawFinance Paradox goes a step further. It proposes that state contingencies, which are
frequently built into modern financial contracts can themselves become the cause for
financial crisis, in particular when an unrealistically low probability is attached to the
possible manifestation of such an event. Still, their basic argument is consistent with
LTF: under conditions of uncertainty contracts may require future adjustment – and not
only at the apex of the financial system.

b. Theories on the Social Structure of Finance
The rise of law and finance has been paralleled in the rapidly expanding field of
financial sociology (Carruthers and Kim 2011). From this perspective finance is a social
system like many others, and financial relations are socially and culturally embedded.
Law is but one of multiple normative (or legal) orders that complement one another or
compete for dominance. Markets develop within these structures and are formed by them.
Detailed case studies developed in this tradition have shown how finance emerges from
and is shaped by social and political structures. A good example is the City of London,
where tensions between the Crown and its private financiers resulted in the creation of
the Bank of England, a privately owned entity that increasingly performed public, market
stabilizing functions (Carruthers 1996). The diamond exchange in New York (Bernstein
1992) is embedded in social practices of Jewish diamond traders, practices that were
sustained even as the trade expanded globally. For hundreds of years the global gold
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market has been similarly embedded in a gentile culture of London-based financial
intermediaries that perceived themselves not only as market participants, but as their apex
stakeholders (Harvey 2010).
Differences in social structures also help explain different strategies used for
introducing consumer credit markets into different countries and legal systems. In
contexts where confidence in a reasonably high repayment rate was high, as in US
consumer lending markets, banks used a ‘big drop’ approach for resolving the problem of
linking consumers, banks and retailers at once: They mailed millions of credit cards to
customers in urban centers in the 1950s (Guseva 2008). Where, in contrast, the absence
of a credit culture suggested that the propensity of repayment was too low to risk such a
strategy, as in post-socialist Russia and other transition economies, banks tied the
issuance of credit cards to managing the bank accounts of customers into which their
salaries were deposited (ibid) (Rona-Tas and Guseva 2013).
Sociologists have also integrated technological change into the analysis of finance.
Electronic trading has eliminated traditional stock or commodities exchanges with their
call-out system where traders could observe the stress their actions were causing on
others standing in same pit next to them (MacKenzie 2006). This has effectively
eliminated the possibility to signal distress at a relatively early state. Information
technology has increased the pace of financial transacting and introduced new systems of
ordering. Computer screens and the logic of algorithms used in the construction of
financial instruments have become new ordering devices (Lepinay 2011).
The argument that finance is embedded in social structures has been taken to new
heights in a subfield of socioeconomics that deals with “performativity” (Callon 1998).
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This concept stands for the notion that by analyzing, observing and modeling the market,
we shape it. These analytical tools are “an engine, not a camera” as MacKenzie has put it
(MacKenzie 2006). In short, markets and the social structures in which they are
embedded are interdependent and shape one another.
LTF has in common with these theories the idea that markets do not exist outside law
or other social structures. The theory does not deny that law is not the exclusive force that
shapes markets. However, it maintains that law plays a more decisive role than most
socioeconomic analyses suggest. Financial relations are built on promises to deliver at a
future date (Carruthers and Kim 2011) – importantly, however, contemporary finance can
no longer rely on social relations to ensure compliance with promises made in the past.
Large scale markets are feasible only if commitments made by someone far afield can be
enforced without any concern for the conditions under which those commitments were
made. The rise of complex financial markets is thus inextricably linked to the legal
construction of these markets.
The notion that private contracting takes place ‘in the shadow of the law’ is, of
course, not new and has been made in particular in reference to self-regulating markets
(Charny 1990). Yet, LTF goes a step further by arguing that absent state backing
contemporary financial markets could not exist. Two factors account for that: the scale
and anonymity of contemporary financial markets, and their need for (occasional)
backstopping which can effectively provided only by an entity with unlimited recourse to
high powered money. Such an entity can by definition only be a state.

40

c. Financial Instability Theories
As discussed at the outset, LTF is premised on uncertainty and liquidity volatility. In
contrast to other theories that have emphasized these attributes of finance, LTF asserts
that the legal structure of financial markets can contribute not only to the success of
financial markets, but also to their undoing. In contrast, Frydman and Goldberg (2011)
argue that financial instability result from the need to adjust investment strategies in light
of new events. Because investment strategies are sticky and are often adjusted only once
price swings have reached extreme territory, adjustment costs tend to be high. They offer
a detailed account of investor behavior, insisting that most of their actions can be deemed
rational in accordance with standard assumptions made in economic theory. 31 Under
conditions of imperfect knowledge, however, rational actions don’t result in equilibrium
outcomes, but instability.
Frydman and Goldberg do not link these insights to the legal and institutional
construction of contemporary financial markets. In part this can be explained by the
choice of financial markets that frame their analysis – equity markets – and in particular
on the allocative function they perform. If investors or traders did not have to concern
themselves with funding the capital they invest, liquidity concerns could indeed be safely
ignored. After all, equity finance is the most stable of financing strategies given its
reliance on future returns rather than future refinancing options. Yet, equity finance does
not operate independently of the manner in which equity positions are funded or the legal
commitments different funding strategies entail. Consider only the difference between
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On the ultimately unsatisfactory attempt by Behavioral Economics to blame irrationality for the failure of
neoclassical models to hold true in the real world, see Rona-Tas and Guseva this issue.
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open- or closed-end investment funds, where the former allow investors to withdraw their
investment at any time just as depositors can pull their money from a bank; the effect of
market-to-market accounting rules on investors who themselves manage a volatile
portfolio of assets; or the ways in which repo markets link securities traders to dealers
that offer short term liquidity (Copeland et al. 2012). In short, allocation and funding are
two sides of the same coin that is finance and should not be separated. The legal structure
of entities and the effects it has on their funding abilities as well as nature of the
contractual commitments they enter into set the stage for financial market development in
good times and their undoing in bad times.
Adding law to their analysis would also refine the policy prescriptions Frydman and
Goldberg derive from their analysis. They see a role for regulators primarily when asset
prices reach extremes, which in light of historical evidence appear unsustainable.
Specifically, they call for a range of “excess-dampening measures”, such as guidancerange announcements and monetary response strategies (Frydman and Goldberg 2011,
240). A legally inspired analysis would suggest that excess is built into financial
contracting long before extreme asset prices are reached, namely at the time of designing
fungible financial contracts with rigid, non-negotiable commitments. Because they are
contractually hardwired, they will run their course irrespective of calls to moderation.
Minsky was more sensitive to the legal structure of finance. While he asserted that
financial markets are “inherently” instable, he also maintained that the relative stability
of financial systems is a matter of social choice and institutional design (Minsky 1986, 7).
If and when markets destabilize, as they will as competition drives them to take positions
that expose them to the vagaries of an uncertain future, proactive intervention is required
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to set them once again on a more stable path. He therefore called for far reaching legal
restructuring of the economy (ibid at pp. 327).
LTF expands this framework in several directions. Minsky concluded his opus
magnum almost 30 years ago, at a time when the credit system was still largely entitybased rather than market-based, as it is today. Markets have also become more
interdependent globally, which requires a framework that is not tailored to a single
system, such as the US. Neither is it sufficient to focus on private credit relations alone.
Lastly, Minsky never developed a political economy of finance, and neither did most
other students of modern finance. LTF expands the institutional analysis from banks to
credit markets, and from domestic to global markets. The theory helps identity patterns of
vulnerability to financial distress that operate across legal systems and offers the starting
point for a more in-depth analysis of the kind Minsky offered for the US system.
Moreover, it offers a framework for tackling the political economy of finance by relating
it to the intersection of finance’s hierarchy and the elasticity of law.
Finally, LTF pushes the frontiers of Mehrling’s ‘Money View’. It builds on his
insight that finance is hierarchically organized. Yet, the “inherent” hierarchy of money is
deconstructed as being in important aspects institutionally determined (see also Mehrling
in this issue). While every credit-based financial system may have a pecking order of
means of pay, the particular configuration of the system, the number and complexity of
financial commitments and their interdependencies is determined by contractual
commitments that are sanctioned by law.
In sum, LTF builds on theories that take seriously the notion of fundamental
uncertainty and liquidity constraints. It expands on these theories by emphasizing that
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financial interdependencies are legally hardwired and suggesting that this can amplify
liquidity constraints when past investments are adjusted in light of new facts. This allows
LTF to point to critical tensions in the makeup of modern-day finance: Its dependence on
law on one hand and law’s potentially destructive effect on finance on the other; the
tendency of law to create regulatory pluralism with corrosive effects on the efficacy of
system-stabilizing laws and regulations; and the interdependency between ‘private’ credit
and ‘public’ money, i.e. the essential hybridity of finance.

6.

Concluding Comments

LTF holds potentially important lessons for future reforms of domestic and global
markets. Since this paper has only introduced a theory that has not been subject to
extensive testing, 32 it would be premature to spell out in detail what these policy
implications might be. In lieu of that, this conclusion suggests how LTF’s reframing of
the relation between law and finance might affect reform strategies already adopted or
currently in the making.
Legislatures in countries around the world have told their constituencies that the
primary goal of these reforms is that “it” would not ever happen again – “it” being the
bailout of major financial intermediaries. Yet, as Minsky pointed out long ago, financial
instability is inherent to modern finance and therefore the “it” he referred to in his paper
“Can “It” happen again” (Minsky 1982 (1963)), namely a major financial crisis, will re-
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occur. The only question is when and how bad it will be – and that, of course, is
impossible to predict with any degree of certainty.
Legislatures have sought to make their commitment to not bailout credible by
tightening rules and strengthening regulatory oversight including for systemically
important banks. Yet, as the Law-Finance Paradox suggests, strengthening commitment
devices alone without reducing the systems’ structural vulnerability to crises can prove
counterproductive. Legislatures have also sought to limit the powers of regulators and
central banks by subjecting bailout decisions to political control (Gadinis 2012).
Politicians have recognized that discretionary decision-making is an exercise of power
that may require political accountability. It remains to be seen where this leaves us in a
future crisis. When staring into the abyss of a financial collapse, politicians like
bureaucrats may opt for rescue rather than self-destruction. As the showdown over the
bailout package in the US in September 2008 has shown (when Congress voted down the
first version of the law33), however, this is by no means a foregone conclusion. Thus,
political control may increase the likelihood that Minsky’s “It” will happen again.
In contrast, recent reforms have not for the most part put the financial system on more
stable footing. Regulation of some entities has been strengthened. Banks in particular
have been taken to task and more derivatives have been forced onto formal exchanges,
reversing in part the 1974 Treasury Amendment. These reforms, however, do not address
the problem of the plurality of legal regimes – public and private – which under
competitive pressure will be exploited by regulatory arbitrage.
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The most important space of regulatory arbitrage is the transnational financial system.
Most financial regulation remains at the national level, with regulatory standardization
the most important mode of transnational coordination. However, agreeing on
standardized rules today that shall apply in an uncertain future does not address the core
problems of contemporary finance. On the contrary, it hamstrings domestic regulators, as
these rules are impossible to alter short of another crisis. This makes the transnational
regulatory regime unresponsive to future change and as such unfit for dealing with an
inherently instable financial system.
Many see a unified regulatory regime at the transnational level as a possible solution.
The most important example is the move towards a European Banking Union
contemplated for the Euro zone. Yet, a global financial regulator would face an
impossible task, and the European Banking Union remains an incomplete solution: It
includes only countries within the Eurozone plus other EU member states that opt into
this structure, but ignores interdependencies with other markets and financial centers,
most importantly with the City of London. Moreover, the banking union is premised on
the belief that financial crises can be prevented by firm ex-ante commitments as
suggested by its emphasis on the enforcement of a common rulebook. This has proven to
be wrong time and again. Indeed, from the perspective of LTF, unbending and
unbendable credible commitments may well increase rather than decrease the likelihood
and/or severity of a crisis. Addressing this Law-Finance Paradox earlier rather than later
by relaxing contractual commitments may prevent a full-scale crisis. This may to some
extent undermine the credibility of many innovative instruments – but that might be
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socially desirable. It makes little sense to lend the coercive powers of the state to
instruments if in doing so it transforms them into “weapons of mass destruction”.34
What is instead needed is an approach to financial regulation that recognizes both the
interdependencies of financial instruments, intermediaries and markets and the ways in
which law can amplify these interdependencies. This may sound like an impossible task
and is certainly contrary to conventional understanding of the role of law in finance as
efficiency enhancing infrastructure. Yet, there are plenty of examples in legal practice
that demonstrate how legal and contractual commitments can be adjusted to take account
of an uncertain future. Credit moratoria in response to draughts or other shocks in
agriculture are one example (Bolton and Rosenthal 2002 discussed supra). The handling
by the German Supreme Court (Reichsgericht) of credit contracts during the period of
hyperinflation in the 1920s is another. After ruling for years that “pacta sunt servanda”,
causing an “endogenous legal boom” that almost brought the legal system to its knees as
more and more creditors rushed to the court systems to beat the loss in value their claims
suffered as the value of the currency was in free fall (Wolf 1993). The court used the
principle of good faith embodied in the civil code to adapt contracts to new
circumstances. The principles it and subsequent courts developed have since been
incorporated into a new provision of Germany’s civil code:
If circumstances which became the basis of a contract have significantly changed
since the contract was entered into and if the parties would not have entered into the
contract or would have entered into it with different contents if they had foreseen this
change, adaptation of the contract may be demanded to the extent that, taking account
of all the circumstances of the specific case, in particular the contractual or statutory
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distribution of risk, one of the parties cannot reasonably be expected to uphold the
contract without alteration.35
One of the major lessons LTF holds is that we need more safety valves of this kind–
not only at the core where law is relatively more elastic to begin with, but also on the
periphery of the system. The alternative is to put our faith into central banks – their
willingness and ability to do the right thing ex post facto. Obviously this raises important
question about how best to design such safety valves; whether courts, regulators, or other
agents are best placed to perform such a role; about who should be empowered to initiate
an intervention and how to ensure that the relief safety valves would offer in times of
distress is not abused or weakens ex ante commitments. These are difficult questions that
require further research and analysis. An important contribution of LTF is to put such
questions up front and center for future financial reforms.
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